Chat Control: What it is, where it is, and how it can affect encryption

Last update: 14th October 2025
  • There are two distinct frameworks: 1.0 (voluntary and in place) and 2.0 (proposed with mandates for detection and debate on encryption).
  • Chat Control 2.0 is not approved: the Council must establish a position, and then a trilogue and final vote will follow.
  • Pre-encryption scanning poses technical and legal risks; legal experts warn of incompatibilities with fundamental rights.

Generic illustration about Chat Control and privacy

The idea of ​​someone snooping through your private messages is far from pleasant, especially when we're talking about conversations protected with end-to-end encryption. Even so, European institutions are debating a regulatory package that could force messaging and email services to analyze content to detect child sexual abuse material. This umbrella of measures is popularly known as Chat Control , and it actually encompasses two distinct frameworks with very different trajectories and effects.

To understand the mess, it's helpful to separate the present from the future. On one hand, there's Chat Control 1.0, already in effect and voluntary for platforms; on the other, there's the proposed Chat Control 2.0, which could make analysis mandatory after a detection order. The second proposal is still being processed and could change, but viral videos claiming it's already approved or imminent have caused a stir on social media, creating confusion about what has actually been decided.

What exactly is Chat Control and why are there two versions?

The nickname Chat Control is used to refer to two European initiatives that aim to combat the spread of child sexual abuse material on digital services. The first, Regulation 2021/1232 (dubbed Chat Control 1.0), adopted in 2021, allows messaging and email providers to voluntarily detect this type of content, without obligating them to do so or giving them an additional legal basis beyond the temporary derogation of certain ePrivacy restrictions.

The second is Regulation 2022/0155, known as Chat Control 2.0 or the Regulation to prevent and combat child sexual abuse. This proposal could impose on platforms a duty to detect and remove content, with detection orders issued by competent authorities when there is a significant risk. Herein lies the crux of the debate: how to reconcile this obligation with end-to-end encryption and the fundamental rights of European citizens.

Representative graph of content detection in chats

Chat Control 1.0 vs. Chat Control 2.0: Key Differences

Chat Control 1.0 authorizes providers to review communications to identify child sexual abuse material, but only on a voluntary basis and with safeguards. Article 3 requires the use of the least intrusive technologies possible and techniques that do not reconstruct the content of conversations, but rather look for patterns or signs associated with abuse. Furthermore, in April 2024, the European Parliament endorsed extending this derogation until April 3, 2026, to allow for a stable, long-term framework.

The Chat Control 2.0 proposal takes a more ambitious turn: in certain circumstances, and following an order from an independent judicial or administrative authority, platforms would have to detect, report, and remove CSAM ( Content Security Ammunition). According to the technical interpretation shared by industry associations, this could involve analyzing content before encryption on the user's device, a process known as client-side scanning. This is where the conflict with the core promise of end-to-end encryption arises.

There is an important distinction: both initiatives place the focus of detection on the providers, not on European institutions monitoring conversations. According to the industry, no EU institution would have access to private messages under these frameworks; when a platform detects indications of CSAM, it must notify law enforcement and judicial authorities or entities with a public interest in child protection.

Status of the procedure: what has been decided and what has not

The Chat Control 2.0 proposal is not yet in force. As of early October 2025, the text is awaiting the completion of its first reading in the Council; Parliament has already stated its position to safeguard the balance between protecting children and preventing widespread surveillance. Following the Council's position, tripartite discussions and a final vote in Parliament will take place before its official publication, if approved.

In this context, messages have been amplified suggesting that the Council would activate the regulation on October 14, 2025. The Danish presidency has indeed prioritized the matter, and the Justice and Home Affairs Council is scheduled to meet on the 13th and 14th, but this step does not directly trigger the regulation's implementation . European sources have clarified that it does not "enter into force" on that date and that the timeline for its adoption and entry into force is currently unpredictable.

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Counts showing support and opposition among states have also gone viral. Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, Croatia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, Latvia, and Lithuania have shown a willingness to move forward, while Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, and Slovakia have been highly critical of any formula that weakens the encryption. Some countries remain undecided in certain counts (for example, Greece, Romania, Estonia, and Slovenia), and Germany's position is considered particularly crucial.

How detection would work: orders, scope and limits

The backbone of the proposal is the system of detection orders. Such an order could only be imposed on a service when there is a significant risk of misuse for child sexual abuse material or for the enticement of minors. The order would be issued by a competent judicial authority or an independent administrative authority, with a limited duration and proportionate oversight.

To minimize impacts, the Commission has stressed the need for state-of-the-art technologies that are incapable of extracting information other than what is strictly necessary, and with specific human oversight to filter out false positives . Furthermore, the draft acknowledges that the detection of child grooming is the most intrusive because it requires text analysis; therefore, its implementation would require a particularly strong justification, and in proposals from some Member States, it would only be applied when one of the parties involved is a minor.

A particularly sensitive issue is the handling of end-to-end encrypted services. Operationally, pre-encryption detection would be performed on the user's device to compare images, videos, or, according to previous versions, text against fingerprint databases or detection models. Many experts equate this local inspection to creating a backdoor , as it opens an additional channel through which content that should be encrypted could be analyzed and flagged before transmission.

Who reviews, who reports and what role does the new European center play?

One of the most common misconceptions on social media is that "the European Union will read all messages." This is not the case. In both scenarios, it is the service providers who carry out the detection using technical tools. If they identify illegal content, they must refer it to the competent authorities or accredited organizations for processing.

The Commission's proposal also envisions the creation of an EU Center on Child Sexual Abuse . Its purpose would be to centralize the receipt of reports, improve cooperation between platforms, civil society, and authorities, and strengthen transparency and audits of the tools and processes used to search for and remove content. This aims to avoid duplication, improve response times, and reduce the risk of leaks during the exchange of sensitive information.

From an industry perspective, if Chat Control 2.0 were adopted, in addition to police and public prosecutors, the Coordinating Authorities designated by Member States to oversee its implementation could be alerted, although this detail remains open for negotiation. The sector emphasizes that the EU would under no circumstances access private chats on its own.

Privacy, encryption, and technical risks: the most serious criticisms

Digital rights organizations, security experts, and legal scholars have criticized the core of the proposal. They argue that client-side scanning undermines the essence of end-to-end encryption , thereby increasing the risk of data breaches. If a method for examining content before encryption is integrated, that method could be exploited by malicious actors, from cybercriminals to hostile governments.

An assessment commissioned by the European Parliament was particularly conclusive: currently, no technology exists that can detect both known and emerging CSAM on a large scale without generating high error rates that impact all traffic on a platform. The study also points to collateral effects, such as the risk of classifying as illegal images shared consensually by teenagers.

Empirical evidence does not inspire optimism. In Ireland, for example, 852 out of 4.192 reports (20,3%) turned out to be exploitation material and 471 (11,2%) were false positives—figures that illustrate the difficult balance between accuracy, volume of reports, and human verification resources.

On the legal front, the Council's Legal Service questioned the proposal's compatibility with fundamental rights such as privacy and data protection, also citing the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU against the widespread retention of data. The European Data Protection Supervisor and the European Data Protection Board, in a joint opinion, warned of the risk of leading to a de facto widespread and indiscriminate scanning of the content of almost any electronic communication.

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Court rulings also carry weight. In February 2024, the European Court of Human Rights held in a case unrelated to this dossier that requiring end-to-end degraded encryption cannot be considered necessary in a democratic society. This legal precedent strengthens the arguments of those calling for the encryption to be enshrined in the final legislation.

Who supports, who rejects and how politics moves

The cause of protecting children is gaining strong support, from child protection activist groups to Commission departments and MEPs of various political stripes, who see a mandatory framework as a response to the inadequacy of voluntary action . They argue that there are gaps due to variability in corporate policies, dependence on reports from the United States, and the lack of an efficient European system for reporting and investigating abuse.

The opposition, however, draws a red line on encryption. In the European Parliament, Greens, social liberals, conservatives, and pirate parties have all raised their voices in a curious cross-party convergence. The recurring idea is that protecting children does not require mass surveillance and that there are less intrusive tools: strengthening police resources, improving cross-border cooperation, cracking down on illicit markets, requiring more security by design from platforms, and working on education and prevention.

The political landscape within the Council is divided. Spain is among those pushing for the measure and has argued that authorities should have access to data in the fight against abuse, while Poland, the Netherlands, Finland, and Austria remain critical. France has wavered, Belgium and Estonia have expressed doubts about implementation, and Germany has shifted from opposition to indecision following changes in government. Denmark, upon assuming the rotating presidency in July 2025, revived negotiations and included the regulation as a high priority.

In public opinion, polls like those by YouGov report clear majorities rejecting widespread scanning. This social climate has translated into waves of pressure on MEPs, especially during 2023 and 2024, when the Council postponed several votes due to a lack of agreement.

Controversies: lobbying, political communication and the role of certain organizations

The process has been accompanied by controversy. Transnational journalistic investigations delved into the role of the US-based Thorn Foundation , backed by public figures, which actively advocates for the deployment of detection tools and markets artificial intelligence software to identify CSAMs. Its interactions with the Commission and the Commissioner responsible for the case have raised concerns about conflicts of interest and pressure from groups with commercial interests.

The Commission's communication strategy has also been criticized, including micro-targeting campaigns and language perceived as ambiguous, which avoids expressions like "mass scanning" in favor of targeted detection and proportionality. Digital rights organizations say they requested formal meetings that were not always answered, which has fueled the narrative of opacity.

Following this debate, initiatives have emerged in other countries. In the United States, for example, political campaigns against privacy protections are being denounced under the guise of combating abuse, and in the United Kingdom, there have been temptations to demand backdoors. The EU risks appearing hypocritical if it promotes measures it criticizes elsewhere, civil society voices point out.

What changes for the average user: practical effects and framework in Spain

If the proposal were to pass in its strictest form, messaging services, email, and even in-game chats could be forced to install automatic image, video, and link detection systems . In end-to-end encrypted services, this would mean analyzing certain content before encryption on your device, leading to a larger attack surface and potential confidentiality issues if something goes wrong.

In Spain, Article 18 of the Constitution guarantees the secrecy of communications except with judicial authorization, and platforms have a duty to cooperate when a court order is issued. With end-to-end encryption, it is currently impossible for platforms to decrypt chats even with a court order, because they do not hold users' keys. A system requiring detection before encryption would change the technical and legal framework, with a far from trivial constitutional implications.

In addition to the technical risks, there are concerns about the chilling effects on the exercise of rights such as freedom of expression and political activism. If users perceive that every image or audio recording can be proactively analyzed, self-censorship may increase, along with the fear of sharing even legal content.

Myths and realities of the viral video circulating on social media

In November 2024 and again in 2025, videos circulated claiming that Chat Control "had already passed all the phases" and that it "would come into effect on October 14." This message is incorrect : proposal 2.0 is still under review, several stages remain, and even if the Council deliberates and establishes a position, this does not imply immediate implementation.

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Another recurring claim is that "the EU will have access to all private messages" and that only X and Telegram would refuse. In reality, the texts place the burden of detection on the platforms , and any scanning prior to encryption would be contingent on specific detection orders. Although several companies have expressed their reluctance to compromise encryption, there is no closed or definitive list of which services would or would not accept a potential European mandate.

Where does all this come from: minimum chronology to situate ourselves

The Commission presented its proposal in May 2022, following years of a dramatic increase in CSAM reports to entities such as the US National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. In 2023, the parliamentary Civil Liberties Committee approved explicitly protecting encryption and eliminating indiscriminate scanning, and during 2024 the Council postponed the vote several times due to a lack of majorities.

In 2024, the Commission worked on revised versions, and leaked drafts circulated that attempted to narrow the scope (for example, by focusing detection on multimedia and links and less on text and audio). The arrival of the Danish Presidency of the Council in July 2025 revived the issue and set the ambition to accelerate a political decision in the autumn, something that has brought the debate back into the headlines and onto the public agenda with renewed intensity.

Proposed proportionality measures and proposed safeguards

To try to pass the necessity and proportionality test, the Council's drafts insist on limiting detection orders in time and scope, requiring objective risk assessments , preferring the least intrusive technologies possible, and mandating audits and human supervision of flagged cases to reduce errors and biases.

It is also proposed that orders cannot exceed limited periods (for example, up to twelve months), that there be reviews, and that the impacts on rights be documented. The stated objective is to avoid general oversight obligations , and the aim is to move towards specific and justified orders.

Relationship with other digital standards and debates

This case does not exist in a vacuum. It coexists with the Digital Services Act, data and privacy regulations, and national frameworks that seek to balance security and fundamental rights. Consistency between these legal instruments will be key to preventing contradictions and gray areas that could lead to abuses or legal uncertainty.

  • Digital Services Law and their due diligence obligations
  • Online Safety Act of 2023 and parallel debates in other countries

Finally, it is important to remember that, even with the will to protect children, technology cannot solve everything . Prevention, digital literacy, strengthening investigative capabilities, and cross-border cooperation are critical elements that experts recommend reinforcing alongside any detection framework.

Looking at the whole picture, Chat Control is a minefield where a just cause coexists with very serious risks to everyone's privacy and security. Version 1.0 allows voluntary detection with safeguards and is extended until 2026; Version 2.0, on the other hand, is an evolving proposal that introduces detection orders with the potential to affect encryption, and has been widely rejected by legal experts, technologists, and privacy organizations. Amid shifting political agendas, social pressures, and technological uncertainties, the final decision will shape the next decade of our communications, so it's crucial to follow the process closely and demand that every step respects the core of our rights.

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TecnoDigital

TecnoDigital

Passionate about technology and software development, I delve into the world of systems and computing with the aim of fostering innovation and solving complex challenges.